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Similarities in behaviour between autistic savants and animals have been suggested, most 
notably by Temple Grandin [1] 
in her book Animals in Translation 
(2005), and this theory seems to have 
gained some consensus among other 
neuroscientists who are not specialists 
in animal cognition. Here we aim to 
discuss two specific parallels between 
the behavioural characteristics of 
animals and those of autistic savants 
that have been raised in relation to 
Grandin’s book. Autistic savants show 
extraordinary skills, particularly in 
music, mathematics, and drawing. 
Do animals sometimes show forms of 
extreme (though, of course, different) 
cognitive skills confined to particular 
domains that resemble those shown 
by autistic savants? We argue that the 
extraordinary cognitive feats shown 
by some animal species can be better 
understood as adaptive specialisations 
that bear little, if any, relationship to 
the unusual skills shown by savants. 
It has also been argued that autistic 
savants “think in detail”, and that this 
is the key to their extraordinary skills. 
Do animals have privileged access to 
lower level sensory information before 
it is packaged into concepts, as has 
been argued for autistic humans, or do 
they process sensory inputs according 
to rules that pre-empt or filter what 
is perceived even at the lowest levels 
of sensory processing? We argue that 
animals, like nonautistic humans, 
process sensory information according 
to rules, and that this manner of 
processing is a specialised feature of 
the left hemisphere of the brain in 
both humans and nonhuman animals. 
Hence, we disagree with the claim that 
animals are similar to autistic savants. 
However, we discuss the possibility that 
manipulations that suppress activity 
of the left hemisphere and enhance 
control by the right hemisphere shift 
attention to the details of individual 
stimuli, as opposed to categories and 
higher-level concepts, and can thereby 
make performance more savant-
like in both humans and animals. 
(Editors note: See Box 1 for Grandin’s 
response.)
Do Animals Think like Autistic 
Savants?
When Grandin proposed similarities 
in cognition between autistic savants 
and animals, she reasoned on the basis 
that animals, like autistic humans, 
sense and respond to stimuli that 
nonautistic humans usually overlook. 
In other words, animals respond to 
and remember the details of the world 
around them, whereas nonautistic 
humans overlook the details in favour 
of the overall whole. Since Grandin’s 
book Animals in Translation shows 
extraordinary insight into both autism 
in humans and animal welfare, the 
question deserves scrutiny from 
scientists working on animal cognition 
and comparative neuroscience.
Put in terms of pathology, the 
question does not make sense, 
and Grandin was not referring to 
animal models that are used to study 
autism (e.g., rodents treated with 
pharmacological agents or raised 
in restricted contexts that induce 
repetitive behaviour [2,3]). She 
was referring to the animals she has 
studied, such as farm animals and 
domestic pets. Since many of these 
animals experience unique physical 
and psychological conditions that can 
be stressful and even distressing, their 
mental processes may be quite different 
from those of wild animals. We wish 
to address the question of animals as 
autistic savants in the broad context 
of animal behaviour in the natural 
environment.
A possible relationship between 
the thinking of autistics and that 
of nonhuman animals has been 
suggested with respect to the so-called 
“theory of mind”, i.e., the ability of 
members of our species to attribute 
intentional (mental) states to others, 
and its absence or weaker expression 
in both autistics and animals. Whether 
nonhuman animals have a fully 
developed theory of mind is still a 
controversial issue (for a review, see 
[4]) and one with which we are not 
specifically concerned here. However, 
impaired social behaviour is an aspect 
of autism in humans that is not shared 
by social, nonhuman animals. 
More recently, autism has been 
linked to a possible deficit in the 
functioning of mirror neurons in 
the cortex [5,6]. Because mirror 
neurons are active in matching actions 
performed by others, even when those 
actions are merely observed, they are 
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When Grandin proposed 
similarities in cognition 
by autistic savants and 
animals, she reasoned 
on the basis that 
animals, like autistic 
humans, sense and 
respond to stimuli that 
nonautistic humans 
usually overlook.
Essays articulate a specific perspective on a topic of 
broad interest to scientists.
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seen as “a potential bridge between 
minds” [6] and certainly as essential to 
social behaviour. Since we know that 
at least some nonhuman species have 
mirror neurons (e.g., macaques [7]), 
the proposed impairment of mirror 
neurons as a core aspect of autism in 
humans provides no support for the 
hypothesis that nonhuman animals 
may be autistic savants, at least as a 
general characteristic of a species. This 
does not preclude the possibility that, 
within a species, individual animals with 
impaired mirror neuron functioning 
could be autistic. 
Snyder and Mitchell [8] consider 
the salient aspect of autistic savants to 
be their “privileged access” to lower-
level sensory information before it is 
packaged into holistic concepts and 
labels (see also [9]). Accordingly, the 
mental processes of autistic humans, 
which are less governed by rules and 
learned concepts that pre-empt and 
filter the perceptions of nonautistic 
humans, are more literal and less 
categorising than those of nonautistics. 
This type of mental processing is often 
seen as lower-order processing and 
hence as a possible link to the mental 
processing abilities of nonhuman 
animals. It is this interpretation that we 
shall address. 
Extraordinary Cognitive Skills
Certain animal species do show 
extraordinary skills in perceptual and 
motor behaviour when compared 
with humans or other animal species. 
Echolocation of bats or dolphins or 
the motor performance of a hunting 
feline are just two examples of such 
extraordinary abilities; yet such skills 
could be better characterized as 
adaptive specialisations. The same 
is probably true in a more-cognitive 
domain. Food-storing birds show 
impressive memory capabilities 
(reviewed in [10]). Clark’s nutcrackers, 
for example, can store and remember 
thousands of caches in the wild [11]. 
Specific neurological adaptations 
accompany these extraordinary 
behaviours: the hippocampus of food-
storing birds is enlarged compared 
with that of phylogenetically related 
species of birds that have not 
developed caching abilities (reviewed 
in [12]). Other studies have shown 
that the hippocampal enlargement 
in food storers arises as a result of the 
specific memory demands required 
for accurately recovering previously 
cached food [13,14]. As in the case 
of autistic savants, the extraordinary 
cognitive abilities of Clark’s 
nutcrackers are limited to a specific 
domain (that of spatial cognition). 
However, unlike autistic savants, 
Clark’s nutcrackers do not show 
any impairment in other cognitive 
domains. The birds’ performance 
when using object-specific cues (as 
opposed to their extraordinary ability 
when using spatial-specific cues) is 
most likely the same as that shown 
by non–food-storing species, and 
comparable to the performance of 
ordinary avian species [12]. This 
contrasts to autistic savants, who have 
impaired cognitive abilities in domains 
other than the one(s) in which they 
show extraordinary abilities [15,16]. 
In other words, the neurological 
adaptation in food-storing birds—the 
enlargement of their hippocampus—
does not seem to be at the expense of 
reduced neural tissue in other parts 
of the brain [17]. It must be said, 
however, that it may be difficult to 
locate a compensatory reduction of 
another brain region, and no research 
has focused on discovering this. 
Interestingly, domain-specific 
cognitive specialisations that result 
from extensive training do show some 
form of neurological compensation: 
it has been reported that, in licensed 
London taxi drivers, an increase in the 
volume of the posterior hippocampus 
is associated with a relative decrease 
in the anterior portion of the same 
structure [18]. Fascinatingly, when 
London taxi drivers were compared 
with London bus drivers, matched 
for driving experience and levels of 
stress but differing in that the latter 
had to follow a constrained set of 
routes, the taxi drivers were found 
to show better scores than the bus 
drivers on London landmarks and 
proximity tests; however, the ability to 
acquire new visuo-spatial information 
was poorer in taxi drivers than in bus 
drivers, apparently as a result of their 
showing a reduced anterior part of the 
hippocampus [19]. The extraordinary 
ability to navigate using landmarks 
acquired by the taxi drivers had come 
at a price—acquiring new visuo-spatial 
information—unlike the extraordinary 
cognitive adaptation of spatial memory 
in the Clark’s nutcracker, which was 
an addition without expense. Savant 
abilities come at a cost to other aspects 
of processing and, therefore, appear 
to be unrelated to the extraordinary 
species-specific adaptations seen in 
some taxa.
Certain animal species can 
reproduce sounds from sources other 
than those that are species-specific, 
and do so in an extraordinarily 
detailed fashion. In songbirds, this 
ability to memorize and reproduce 
sounds depends on a set of nuclei in 
the forebrain [20]. For most humans 
without any impairment, the ability to 
reproduce sounds tends to be limited 
to some phrases. Usually, it requires 
practice and repeated exposure to 
reproduce a whole song or musical 
passage, and to produce a complete 
rendition without such repetition 
is rare. Mozart was portrayed in the 
film “Amadeus” as a musical savant 
because he was able to write down 
an entire concerto on the basis of 
having heard it once. Some birds may 
be able to compete with this ability. 
Australian magpies have been recorded 
as mimicking a complex sequence 
of sounds from a kookaburra duet 
or even learning a whole song on 
a single exposure [21]. Sonograms 
have revealed that the structure of the 
rendering was also extremely accurate. 
Whether or not one can compare 
Mozart’s achievement with that of 
a bird remains questionable, but it 
appears that the principle in each case 
is the same: the entirety of the sound 
sequence had been absorbed, encoded, 
and committed to memory well enough 
that its faithful reproduction was 
possible. It is not known in the case of 
magpies whether their ability leads to 
compensatory diminishment of other 
areas in the brain. Their song system 
is the same as in other songbirds [22], 
and their hyperpallium (referring to 
visual processing) is, in fact, especially 
large [23,24]. 
Savant abilities come at 
a cost in other aspects 
of processing and, 
therefore, appear to 
be unrelated to the 
extraordinary species-
specific adaptations 
seen in some taxa.
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Do Animals Think in Details?
It has been argued that autistic people 
think in details and have difficulty 
grouping attributes into holistic 
pictures and forming labels. One 
autistic boy, for example, learned the 
concept of a giraffe through a detail—
the pattern of the coat—not the long 
neck or overall shape. As a result, he 
also identified a leopard as a giraffe 
[15,25–27].
Grandin states animals think like 
autistic savants. Normal humans are 
good at seeing the big picture but 
bad at what Grandin calls “all the tiny 
little details that go into that picture”. 
For normal humans, the big picture is 
not created by accumulating sensory 
details, but rather by filtering out 
details [27]. Like autistic people—and 
unlike normal humans—animals, 
Grandin argues (as does Snyder for 
autistic savants) have direct access to 
the raw sensory data that an ordinary 
human brain would discard by filtering 
out. Grandin also argues that humans 
evolved larger association areas than 
nonhuman animals and that, in order 
to avoid overloading these association 
areas, access to raw sensory data should 
be strictly limited. 
We believe, however, that there 
is little evidence in support of these 
views. It is true that when humans 
process visual stimuli, global 
information often takes precedence 
over local information. For instance, 
in Navon’s experiments [28], people 
are shown collections of a particular 
letter arranged to form a global 
configuration that is also a letter (e.g., 
an “H” made up of “S”s). Identification 
responses are usually faster for the 
global configurations than for the local 
letters. Some studies have pointed 
to a local precedence effect in both 
pigeons [29] and nonhuman primates 
[30–32]. However, more recent work 
has shown that local information does 
not always take precedence over global 
information in nonhuman animals. 
For instance, in certain conditions, 
pigeons can acquire a global-feature 
categorisation more rapidly than a 
local-feature categorisation, exactly as 
do humans [33]. It seems that the local-
feature precedence observed in these 
studies simply results from the specific 
stimuli and procedures employed 
(e.g., the subtended visual angle and 
the density of local elements, see also 
[34]).
Similar arguments apply to the 
celebrated studies (e.g., [35]) showing 
that pigeons showed no decrement in 
recognizing stimuli that were spatially 
scrambled, and therefore suggesting 
that pigeons’ discriminative responding 
is controlled by local features alone. In 
contrast, more recent work has shown 
that pigeons use both global and local 
aspects of the stimuli, with different 
mixtures of these types of information 
depending on the particular perceptual 
context [36]. For instance, pigeons 
trained to discriminate cartoon people 
on a variety of background scenes 
attend to global aspects of cartoon 
people; on the other hand, using line 
drawings of cartoon faces as stimuli and 
examining the effects of scrambling 
and deletion of components showed 
that a set of components (eyes and 
eyebrows) appear to exert strong 
control over behaviour and scrambling 
only moderately suppresses responding 
[37].
The mechanisms that determine 
prevalence of processing details or 
the big picture seem to be similar in 
human and nonhuman species. There 
could be two senses in which “details” 
are assembled into a big picture. 
One is the operating of preattentive 
mechanisms of perceptual grouping 
to segregate figures from ground and 
parse objects in visual scenes. These 
mechanisms are largely bottom-up and 
data driven. The other is the extraction, 
from already segregated and parsed 
details and parts of stimuli and events, 
of higher-order categories and concepts 
on the basis of past experience. These 
mechanisms are attentive and affected 
by overall knowledge and beliefs. They 
are top-down mechanisms. 
As to the early processing 
mechanisms of segregation and 
grouping, here sometimes differences 
between species can be observed, and 
certain animals may indeed show an 
inclination to attend to details in some 
contexts, probably because of specific 
adaptations. Pigeons, for instance, 
when faced with illusory figures like 
the famous Kanizsa’s triangle [38] 
(Figure 1) show a tendency to attend 
to the inducing pac-man rather than 
extracting the overall triangular figure. 
In a study on subjective contours 
with Kanizsa’s triangles and squares, 
Prior and Güntürkün [39] found that 
only four out of 14 animals tested 
succeeded. As indicated by control 
tests, pigeons responding to subjective 
contours were attending to the global 
pattern of the stimuli, whereas pigeons 
not responding to subjective contours 
were attending to the local details 
of the stimuli. Pigeons also showed 
similar difficulties when dealing 
with recognition of partly occluded 
objects, to which they tend to respond 
literally to the visible parts instead of 
mentally completing them [40,41]. It 
is important to note, however, that this 
clearly shows relative preference for 
pigeons to attend to some aspects of 
a visual scene rather than an absolute 
Very generally, the left 
hemisphere sets up rules 
based on experience and 
the right hemisphere 
avoids rules in order 
to detect details and 
unique features that 
allow it to decide what 
is familiar and what is 
novel. This is true for 
human and nonhuman 
animals, likely reflecting 
ancient evolutionary 
origins of the underlying 
brain mechanisms. 
February 2008  |  Volume 6  |  Issue 2  |  e42
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0060042.g001 
Figure 1. The Kanizsa Triangle
Animals do experience the illusion, although 
some species may be more inclined to attend 
to details, of the pac-man before extracting 
the overall triangular shape (see text).
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inability, because more recent evidence 
has revealed that pigeons are able both 
to see subjective contours [42] and 
to complete partly occluded objects 
[43,44]. Also, this is clearly not a 
general characteristic of the avian brain 
as opposed to the mammalian brain, 
because other species of birds show no 
attributes similar to those of pigeons 
(e.g., domestic chicks, zebra finches 
and owls; see [45–49]). 
It seems likely that there could 
be ecological differences favouring 
perception based on response to 
parts or reconstruction of whole 
objects on the basis of interpolation 
between these parts. Linking function 
to structure, it is interesting to 
observe that in experiments using 
conditioning procedures, such as 
those performed with pigeons, the 
stimuli were presented in the frontal 
binocular visual field of the animals, 
a portion of the visual field that 
is mainly represented within the 
tectofugal pathway in pigeons [50,51]. 
The frontal visual field seems to be 
specialized for (myopic) foraging for 
food on the ground, whereas the lateral 
visual field seems to be specialized 
for predator detection and flight 
control. Near-sighted acuity would 
favour examination of fine stimulus 
details (as demonstrated in use of the 
frontal, binocular field in selecting 
between food types [52]) and may be 
responsible for the local advantages 
observed in most experiments that used 
frontal presentations of visual stimuli. 
The lateral visual fields, in contrast, 
may be more concerned with the larger 
scale integration of scene and flight 
control information [53], thus showing 
more sensitivity to global information 
(see [54]). 
Specialisation of the left and right 
sides of the brain (lateralisation) may 
be instrumental in attending to detail 
or the big picture in the first of the two 
senses mentioned above. As in humans 
[55–57], gestalt-like properties of visual 
scenes seem to be associated with 
right hemispheric function in animals 
(reviewed in [58–60]. In chicks, 
amodal completion has been proven 
to be more likely to occur under right 
hemispheric control [61], exactly as 
it is in humans [62]. Moreover, the 
right hemisphere of the chick attends 
to global, spatial cues as opposed 
to landmark cues, to which the left 
hemisphere attends [63].
There is however another, more 
top-down, route to the integration 
of details for the formation of a big 
picture: a specialisation of the left 
hemisphere. We see what we expect. 
And what we expect is encapsulated 
in our mindsets—mental templates 
formed largely by experience. Brains 
are wired to present us with the best 
hypothesis, the best guess based 
on our prior experience, especially 
experience in early life [27,64]. But 
autistic savants, according to some 
conceptions, would be literal in the 
sense that, overwhelmed by details, they 
would be impaired in their ability to 
extract general, higher-order concepts 
on the basis of past experience. This 
means that they would have less access 
than nonautistics to left hemisphere 
processing.
Animals, of course, cannot be autistic 
in this sense. They are not literal, but 
have mindsets allowing them to be fast 
at executing their lifestyle within their 
particular niche. Unlike autistic people, 
animals are not overwhelmed by detail. 
Quite interestingly, they also show 
brain specialisations similar to those 
revealed in humans in terms of the 
roles that the two cerebral hemispheres 
play in assembling categories and 
thus discarding idiosyncratic details 
in favour of invariant properties when 
analyzing stimuli and events (reviewed 
in [58,65–67]).
The savant syndrome is often 
associated with some left brain 
dysfunction, together with right brain 
compensation [68]. Snyder has shown 
[69–73] that it is possible to induce 
savant-like skills in normal healthy 
people by inhibiting the left anterior 
temporal lobe with magnetic pulses 
at the rate of 1 pulse per second—a 
process known as transcranial magnetic 
stimulation, or TMS. But why does this 
inhibition of the left anterior temporal 
lobe induce savant-like skills? 
Gazzaniga [74] refers to the 
function of the left hemisphere as the 
“interpreter”. The left hemisphere 
tends to create a belief system 
or mindset and to fold any new 
information into the existing belief 
system. The hemispheres are in 
competition with one another, with the 
hypothesis-imposing left hemisphere 
dominating or inhibiting the right 
hemisphere, which is more open to 
novelty [27]. The right hemisphere, 
on the other hand, tends to play, as 
Ramachandran [75] has put it, the role 
of the “Devil’s advocate”, looking for 
February 2008  |  Volume 6  |  Issue 2  |  e42
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Figure 2. Lateralization in the Avian Brain, Illustrated Using the Australian Magpie, 
Gymnorhina tibicen
Behaviour controlled by the left and right hemispheres is listed. As in humans, functions of the left 
hemisphere are consistent with those of autistic humans. 
(Photograph: G. Kaplan, Centre for Neuroscience and Animal Behaviour, University of New England, 
Australia)
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novelty and inconsistencies. Because of 
its duty to recognize novelty, the right 
hemisphere is forced to maintain a 
more literal record of the events. 
It is quite fascinating that similar 
specialisations of the two hemispheres 
have been reported for the nonhuman 
animal brain (reviewed in [76]). In the 
domestic chick, for example, which 
is probably the most investigated 
animal species with respect to brain 
lateralisation [65,77,78], evidence 
has been collected that the right 
hemisphere mainly attends to novelty 
and focuses on those unique and 
idiosyncratic properties of visual stimuli 
that may help to establish whether a 
particular stimulus is or is not the same 
as the one encountered before. The 
left hemisphere, in contrast, tends to 
attribute stimuli to categories in order 
to provide fast and efficient responses. 
In so doing, the left hemisphere tends 
to attend to the general characteristics 
of the stimuli, rather than to the 
details (see Figure 2). (Note that by 
attention to “details” here, we do 
not mean raw sensory information, 
but rather the information on 
parts available after applying 
gestalt mechanisms of perceptual 
processing at the preattentive level.) 
A noticeable example is the role 
of the two hemispheres in social 
recognition associated with imprinting, 
in which the left hemisphere builds 
up a representation of the general 
properties of the social partner 
(without including in it individual 
recognition), whereas the right 
hemisphere encodes the peculiar and 
unique properties of a social partner 
as an individual [79, 80]. Similarly, 
when presented with grains scattered 
on a background of inedible pebbles, 
a chick using its left hemisphere 
categorises the array of stimuli as food/
nonfood and avoids pecking at the 
pebbles, whereas a chick using the right 
hemisphere pecks at both grain and 
pebbles, each as a separate and novel 
entity [81].
A general theoretical framework 
for these findings has been proposed, 
based on the idea of “functional 
incompatibility” [67]. When assessing 
a novel stimulus—an event likely to be 
faced quite commonly even by the most 
primitive vertebrates—an organism 
must carry out two different types of 
analyses. First, it must rely on previous 
comparable experiences to estimate the 
degree of novelty of the stimulus, and 
to do so it must recall stored memories 
and then elaborate on them for future 
use. Secondly, certain appropriate 
cues, based on past experience (or on 
phylogenetically based information), 
must be used to try to assign the 
stimulus to a category, and so to decide 
what sort of response (if any) should 
be given. Categorisation must be 
made on the basis of selected stimulus 
properties, despite variation in many 
other properties. All this is reminiscent 
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Editors note: We asked Temple Grandin to respond to the essay “Are 
Animals Autistic Savants?”, which presents a critique, based on studies 
of comparative animal cognition, of Grandin’s premise that animals and 
autistic savants share similarities in cognition. 
The Essay “Are Animals Autistic Savants?” by Giorgio 
Vallortigara et al. provides a fascinating overview of the 
most recent research on animal cognition. I think the basic 
disagreement between the authors and me arises from the 
concept of details—specifically how details are perceived by 
humans, who think in language, compared with animals, who 
think in sensory-based data. Since animals do not have verbal 
language, they have to store memories as pictures, sounds, or 
other sensory impressions. Sensory-based information by its very 
nature is more detailed than word-based memories. As a person 
with autism, all my thoughts are in photo-realistic pictures. I can 
search my own brain, like using Google, for images. As I read 
about the cognition experiments, I saw the birds performing 
in my imagination like a virtual reality computer system. The 
main similarity between animal thought and my thought is the 
lack of verbal language. Verbal language narrates the images 
when I “surf the Internet” inside my own brain. If you give me 
a “keyword,” such as “peanut,” I start to see images like a series 
of slides shown one after the other. The first image was the 
Planter’s Peanut logo, the second was a Western restaurant that 
serves peanuts, and the third was a bag of peanuts on a plane.
The Essay by Vallortigara et al. clearly showed that cognition 
is very real in animals. In normal humans, higher brain processes 
cover up the sensory-based processing that we share with 
animals. In Animals in Translation, I discussed the work of 
Bruce Miller, who studied patients with frontal-temporal lobe 
dementia [1,2]. As the disease destroyed higher brain function, 
art and music talent emerged. The sensory-based, more-detailed 
thinking we share with animals was unmasked.
I was most interested to learn that the skills that taxi drivers 
had developed to navigate by using land markers “had come at 
the price of acquiring new visual spatial information” according 
to the authors. Further experiments need to be done with birds 
to either confirm or disprove Vallortigara et al.’s hypothesis 
that birds such as the Clark’s nutcracker, which has savant-like 
memory for food storage, has retained good cognition in other 
domains. My hypothesis is that birds that have savant-like skills 
for food storage sites or remembering migration routes may 
be less flexible in their cognition. It is well known that people 
with autism do poorly on the Wisconsin card sorting task, where 
colors and shapes have to be sorted into different categories. 
The person with autism is slower to respond correctly when the 
category is switched from a shape to a color.
An operant conditioning task could be used to compare 
flexible problem solving in migratory and food-storing bird 
species to species that do not have savant-like skills. The task 
could be to peck a lever when a light comes on. After the bird 
had learned this, the stimulus would be switched to a sound. I 
predict that the more savant-like birds will require more trials to 
switch back and forth between the light and the sound cue.
I am pleased that my book has stimulated so much 
discussion, and I hope it stimulates more research on animal 
cognition. 
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of the functional incompatibility 
among logical demands, a condition 
hypothesized to underlie the evolution 
of multiple memory systems by Sherry 
and Schachter [82]. To categorise 
events (or stimuli), the organism 
must recognise, and memorise, 
those features of an experience (or 
of a stimulus) that recur in different 
episodes (or stimuli) and, at the same 
time, ignore or discard unique and 
idiosyncratic features that do not recur 
and thus are not essential to learning. 
The selective attention that results is 
one of the brain’s main functions, as 
it enables the smooth, and eventually 
automatic, execution of skilled motor 
behaviour, performed in response to 
certain invariant features of episodes. 
In contrast, to detect novelty and to 
build up a detailed record of episodic 
experiences, the organism must attend 
to the contextual details that mark 
individual experiences uniquely, i.e., 
to recognize variance across episodes 
rather than invariance. Processing 
of information about invariance and 
variance between experiences requires 
the use of mutually incompatible 
processes that might best be handled by 
functionally separate systems. 
Overall, and very generally, the left 
hemisphere sets up rules based on 
experience, and the right hemisphere 
avoids rules in order to detect details 
and unique features that allow it to 
decide what is familiar and what is 
novel. This is true for human and 
nonhuman animals, likely reflecting 
ancient evolutionary origins of the 
underlying brain mechanisms. 
None of the evidence mentioned 
above favours the idea that animals 
attend to details more than humans 
do. The balance between attending 
to details or the big picture may, of 
course, vary between species and 
within the same species depending on 
ecological constraints and perceptual 
contexts, but it is performed by 
similar brain mechanisms, without any 
clear-cut divide between human and 
nonhuman species. ◼
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